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Abstract: In this position paper we examine the various risks in component-based development. We divide the 
risks into six main categories and argue that they not only overlap but also cut across the various application 
development stages. We propose a risk management mechanism based on identifying risk management 
techniques for each individual risk category and then integrating the various individual techniques into a global 
strategy. 
1. Introduction 
Component-based development (CBD) is being proposed as a low risk development strategy which provides a 
simple and rapid mechanism for increasing the functionality and capability of a system. It promises instant 
productivity gains, accelerated time to market and lower development cost. Many of the problems in 
component-based development are a consequence of this poor appreciation of the risks involved and their 
management. In fact component-based development poses significant risks to organisations intending to adopt 
the technology. This is particularly critical for small organisations for which the failure of a project can result in 
the organisation going out of business. 
In this position paper we examine the various risks involved in CBD. The risks are categorised on the basis of 
six key application development activities: component evaluation, system integration, development process, 
application context, system quality and system evolution. We argue that risks in one category not only overlap 
with risks in other categories but also cut across several stages of a component-based development cycle. 
Categorising CBD risks into different categories makes it possible to better appreciate their cross-cutting and 
overlapping nature. It also provides grounds for effective separation of concerns as management strategies for 
risks in each individual category can be separately identified. The various strategies can then be integrated into 
one global risk management strategy. 
2. Risks in Component-based Development 
Table 1 provides a summary of various CBD risks. These risks stem from four main factors, which are a 
consequence of the componentware paradigm: 
 
• The blackbox nature of commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) software.  
• The quality of COTS software. 
• The lack of component interoperability standards. 
• The disparity in the customer-vendor evolution cycles.   
 
The risks are organised into 6 main categories: evaluation, integration, context, quality, evolution and process 
risks. Evaluation risks are associated with problems of evaluating off-the-shelf software for use in system 
development.  Integration risks relate to the problems of composing systems from COTS software. Context risks 
relate to the problems of using similar components in different application contexts. Process risks are associated 
with the problems of using an inappropriate development process. Quality risks stem from the perceived 
reliability of COTS components and the ease with which their capabilities can be verified. Evolution risks are 
related to the extended development and management of component-based applications. 
 
Risk category Risk 
Evaluation • COTS software is almost always delivered as blackbox components with limited 
specification making it difficult to predict how the components behave under 
different loads. 
• There is a general lack of methods for mapping user requirements to component-
based architectures. 
• Components are packaged and delivered in many different forms (e.g. function 
libraries, off-the-shelf applications and frameworks) 
• Component frameworks offer varying features (e.g. component granularity, 
tailorability, platform support, distributed system support, interoperability) 
  
Integration • Most component integration processes suffer from inflexibility and poor 
component evaluation schemes. This problem is often compounded by a lack of 
interoperability standards between component frameworks and adequate vendor 
support. 
• Most COTS software is generally not tailorable or “plug and play”. Significant 
effort may be required to build wrappers and the “glue” between components in 
order to evolve the application or tailor components to new situations. As the 
system evolves these wrappers must be maintained. 
• There is a general lack of interoperability standards to facilitate the integration of 
components implemented using different component technologies. 
Context Components for well-understood domains are more likely to have readily available 
COTS equivalents than specialised domains (e.g. safety-critical systems), which are 
often context dependent and impose stringent dependability requirements on the 
system. The variability of specialised systems and the competing nature of their quality 
attributes often make it difficult to adapt components to different application contexts 
without major modifications. 
Process The software development process being used by the organisation might not be suitable 
for CBD. Boehm [1] regards both waterfall model and evolutionary development as 
unsuitable for CBD because 
(i) in the waterfall model requirements are identified at an earlier stage and the 
components chosen at a later stage might not offer the required features. 
(ii) evolutionary development assumes that additional features can be added if 
required. However, components cannot be upgraded for one particular 
development team. The lack of code availability bars the development team from 
adjusting them to their needs. 
Quality • The design assumptions of a COTS component are unknown to the application 
builder. This problem combines with poor component specification to diminish the 
quality of testing that can be done on the component. It also significantly increases 
the potential for failing to interact with other system components. 
• COTS component heterogeneity may result in complicated licensing arrangements 
in which no single vendor has complete control over the development artefacts for 
the purpose of testing. 
• A new version of COTS software is likely to contain new features that are not used 
by the system. There is a risk that unused features may still have some indirect 
impact on the system behaviour.  
• The perception of quality may vary across COTS software vendors and application 
domains. For many vendors the time-to-market may be more important than 
delivering a high-level of reliability. 
• The use of COTS software introduces a vulnerability risk that may compromise 
system security or safety. This is particularly critical for distributed systems and 
safety-related systems. 
Evolution • The different customer-vendor evolution cycles may result in an uncertainty about 
how often COTS components in a system may have to be replaced and the extent 
of the impact of such a change on  the rest of the system. This makes it difficult to 
plan and predict costs over the life cycle of a system. 
• Upgrading to a new version of COTS software poses several risks: 
(i)  Hidden incompatibilities may cause unforeseen side effects in the system 
necessitating a complete system update.  
(ii)   Changes in the quality attributes of a new version of COTS software (e.g. 
performance, security, safety, reliability etc.) may be incompatible with the 
user requirements. This may adversely affect the operational capabilities of 
the system.  
(iii) A new version of COTS software may provide additional undocumented 
capabilities. 
Table 1: Risks in component-based development 
2.1 Cross-cutting and Overlapping Nature of Risks 
Figure 2 maps the different categories of CBD risks to development stages in a generic CBD cycle. The risks are 
shown to the right of the diagram. Black sections on the vertical lines indicate the development stage affected by 
  
the risk category.   Quality (Q) and process (P) risks cut across the entire development cycle and must be taken 
into account at every development stage. The Evaluation (E) risks largely cross-cut the early development stages 
of requirements analysis and system design. Integration (I) risks affect system composition.  Context (C) risks 
mainly affect the system design stage. Evolution (Evol) risks affect extended development. It should also be 



























Fig. 2. Cross-cutting and overlapping nature of risks in CBD 
3. Risk Management using Separation of Concerns 
Categorising the various CBD risks into individual categories makes it possible to identify risk management 
mechanisms for them in isolation from other overlapping risks. Table 2 describes the risk management 
mechanisms for each individual risk category in table 1. These can then be integrated into one global risk 
management strategy for a CBD cycle as discussed next. 
Risk category Risk Management Mechanisms 
Evaluation • COTS components tend to address common rather than detailed requirements in 
an application domain. Overly specific system requirements tend to preclude the 
use of COTS components.  The process of evaluating and qualifying off-the-shelf 
software components should be driven by a criteria that maps critical system 
requirements to the following COTS attributes: component feature set, component 
configurability, documentation (specification, usage history, test reports, etc.), cost  
of purchase and reuse, licensing restrictions, reliability, short-term and long-term 
vendor support. 
• Component-based systems are designed on pre-defined architectures that set out 
the rules for component connection and interaction. A requirements method for 
component-based systems must take into account not only stakeholder 
requirements, but also the nature of the application and the constraints imposed by 
the reference architecture. 
• Selecting the appropriate application/component framework is difficult as 
commercial frameworks support different features. In choosing a component 
framework, the following nine considerations should be taken into account: 
granularity, auto-description, event model, platform independence, capability, 
interoperability, security, versioning and distributed systems support. 
Integration • Extensive modifications to a COTS component to address ‘tricky’ system 
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benefits of component-based development and add to the complexity of the 
project and future application maintenance. 
• A good understanding of a component’s capabilities is essential for making an 
informed evaluation of the component and deploying it. Off-the-shelf components 
whether developed in-house or acquired as third party components, should be 
accompanied with adequate documentation (i.e. specification, usage history, 
version information, and test reports).  
• It is important that project estimates allow adequate time and resources for 
evaluating COTS software. Many problems encountered in COTS software are 
difficult to anticipate before integration making it difficult to estimate schedules 
and resource requirements. Early evaluation helps to ensure that the component 
has the desired functionality, and that any additional functionality inherent within 
the component does not interfere with the system.  
• Standards are critical to COTS-based reuse. Developers should be encouraged to 
build systems, which comply with established component standards. However, 
the use of standards should not be seen as a means to diminish the need for 
rigorous evaluation of COTS components. 
• All systems should be built with the assumption that one day the systems will be 
off-the-shelf components for larger systems.  In-house quality review procedures 
and documentation standards can help to ensure this. 
Context • A COTS software solution may not be appropriate or even desirable for certain 
classes of system (e.g. critical systems). For these types of system the limitations 
of COTS components may require that system requirements are relaxed or a 
custom solution considered. It is important that context risks are taken into account 
when evaluating off-the-shelf software. 
• Recording details of the various contexts and test results from the projects in 
which the component has been used helps counter the contextual risks. When 
using a component it is clear whether it has been used in a particular context and 
its effectiveness in the environment. The contextual details also help determine 
which multiple vendor products are compatible or interoperate smoothly. Detailed 
reuse specification also helps minimise the contextual risks. It clearly identifies the 
reuse contract of a component i.e. the pre-conditions, post-conditions and 
invariants [2]. However, recording the reuse contract alone is not sufficient. Even 
if the reuse contract of a component satisfies the usability requirements other 
factors such as response time, etc. might not be acceptable. The reuse specification 
should, therefore, record a level of detail similar to hardware components i.e. the 
various inputs and their corresponding outputs, response time, scale, etc. The 
inputs and outputs can be recorded in terms of boundary values. 
Process • Development models which explicitly take risk analysis into account are more 
suitable for component-based development than the traditional waterfall model or 
evolutionary approaches [1]. Models based on risk analysis must be simplified if 
they are to be employed effectively in small organisations. The limited resources 
of small organisations often lead to skipping essential software engineering 
processes, which directly affects the quality of the product.  
• Most component-based system development tends to be centred around particular 
application domains. A component repository [3] is, therefore, feasible and can 
help to effectively minimise many risks identified earlier. A component stored in 
the repository should be accompanied by: details of all the contexts in which it 
was used, detailed testing results from all the projects in which it was employed, 
detailed reuse specification, details of the development team (in case of an in-
house component) or the vendor (in case of COTS) and details of maintenance 
facilities available and histories of upgrades. 
Quality • There are four different testing scenarios that can be applied to component-based 
systems to minimise the risk of faulty components being introduced into the 
system. 
 (1) Prior to deployment. It is essential that the system integrator tests a new 
COTS component prior to deploying it in a larger system.  
(2) Integrated system. If a new component is added to the system or an older 
version replaced, the integrated system must be tested. Testing should also 
be done if the system configuration is altered. Developers often assume that 
  
successful use of a component in one project implies successful use in 
another one. However, the contexts in which the component is to be used 
might differ considerably. For example, a component successfully used in 
Ariane 4 resulted in an exception in Ariane 5 causing it to explode [2]. This 
is because the two trajectories and hence the two contexts in which the 
component was used were different. The Mars Climate Orbiter was lost due 
to the use of imperial units in a ground software file when the remaining 
components of the system were using metric units [4]. 
(3) Regression testing. It is a good idea to perform regression testing on 
selective critical system components whenever new versions of other 
constituent components are installed in the system.  
(4) Non-functional testing. Various kinds of non-functional testing on the 
system is required to ensure that the system meets the desired level of 
performance, dependability, stress and loading. 
• Detailed testing results help to avoid test repetitions when application contexts are 
similar but not identical. 
• Realistic test goals should be set that take into account the resources and criticality 
of the components in the system being tested. 
Evolution • Market research should be conducted regularly during maintenance to determine 
the availability of new commercial hardware and software products, and to 
estimate the frequency and types of changes in the COTS components employed 
in a component-based system. This information can be used to perform an impact 
analysis for any replacements being considered for COTS software components or 
hardware components that affect the software configuration. This minimises the 
risks posed by the lack of synchronisation between the vendor-customer product 
evolution cycles.  
• Upgrade impact analysis should be carried out to determine the cost and difficulty 
of introducing a replacement for a COTS product that is either a new product or 
newer version of an existing product. This activity must consider the impact of the 
change on the operational system, the software in the system, or the software 
maintenance process. This minimises the risks posed by the lack of 
synchronisation between the vendor-customer product evolution cycles.  
• Asset management i.e. management of financial aspects of acquiring, using, 
servicing, and upgrading COTS products. For software, asset management focuses 
on an inventory of COTS products, versions, where they reside, and financial 
obligations such as licenses associated with them. This minimises the risks posed 
by the uncertainty in life-cycle planning and budgeting, and helps in maintaining 
system quality. 
• Quality control should include fault identification, repair, and testing of installed 
and proposed COTS software. It should also include the insertion of fixes (that a 
vendor delivers with a system release) into the system. This minimises the risks 
posed by the difficulty in ensuring and maintaining system quality. 
• Configuration management i.e. tracking and controlling the versions of all COTS 
products and custom software installed at all locations for the system. 
• Logistics support i.e. the acquisition, distribution, and installation of copies of 
upgraded COTS software. It should also include the re-installation of COTS 
software products when the installed copies have been corrupted, which is not 
uncommon in some COTS software after a period of reuse. 
Table 2: Risk management mechanisms for risks in each category 
 
Having identified risk management strategies for each individual CBD risk category we now integrate these 
different techniques into one global risk management strategy. The integration is based on factoring out the 
common mechanisms underlying the various individual strategies. From table 2 we observe that the core 
mechanism underlying the various risk management techniques is a component repository. It is referred to by 
risk management strategies for each risk category. Other common mechanisms include risk analysis, impact 
analysis and testing. These mechanisms exploit the functionality and information exposed by the component 
repository and act as a basis of risk management mechanisms for each individual risk category. The global risk 






Fig. 3: Global risk management strategy 
4. Summary and Conclusion 
This position paper has provided a software engineering perspective on cross-cutting concerns. We have 
highlighted the various risks that cut across a component-based development cycle. We have categorised the 
risks into six categories and proposed a risk management mechanism based on identifying risk minimisation 
strategies for each category individually. The individual risk minimisation strategies are then integrated into one 
global strategy. The discussion presented in this paper highlights the fact it is important to consider high-level 
“abstract” concerns along with programmatic concerns for effective separation of concerns throughout a 
software development cycle. 
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